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Abstract 
When civil servants conscientiously refuse to register same-sex marriages, a clash arises 
between freedom of religion and same-sex equality. The scholarly world is divided on the 
optimal way to tackle this human rights clash. States, however, are not. Courts and legislators 
in the US, the UK and the Netherlands – among others – have decisively and unequivocally 
sided with same-sex equality. This Article contributes to the debate by presenting an 
alternative to existing scholarly analyses, which the author finds wanting. The Article’s 
primary aim is to offer a coherent account of the relevant practice in the UK and the 
Netherlands. The Article’s core argument is that this practice is best understood in terms of 
the limits of toleration in liberal States. The author argues, in particular, that the UK courts 
and Dutch legislator have drawn those limits at the point where civil servants cause same-sex 
couples expressive harm.  
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1 Introduction 
 
When civil servants conscientiously refuse to register same-sex marriages, a clash arises 
between freedom of religion and same-sex equality.
1
 This human rights clash has been in the 
spotlights in recent years. It has not only attracted concerted scholarly attention,
2
 but also 
widespread media coverage. In September 2015, for example, US county clerk Kim Davis 
made domestic
3
 and international headlines
4
 when she was jailed for refusing to register any 
and all marriages in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Obergefell v. Hodges ruling on same-
sex marriage.
5
  
 But Ms. Davis was certainly not the first, and will probably not be the last, civil 
servant to refuse to apply the law on same-sex marriage/partnership. In the UK, Lillian Ladele 
famously preceded her. Following the enactment of the 2004 Civil Partnership Act, Ms. 
Ladele, a civil registrar for the London Borough of Islington, initially made practical 
                                                          
1
 An anonymous reviewer for Religion & Human Rights noted that the term ‘conscientious objection’ is not 
uncontroversial in relation to marriage officials, because of the alleged difference with conscientious objection to 
abortion and military service (both discussed in the Conclusion of this Article). When I utilise the term 
‘conscientious objection’ (and analogues such as ‘conscientiously object to’) in relation to civil servants, I refer 
in the first place to the reasons civil servants invoke to refuse to perform marriage services. These reasons are 
related to their conscience and inability to reconcile the act of registration of same-sex marriages with their 
religious convictions. In that descriptive sense, their refusal mirrors that of health professionals who refuse to 
perform abortions and Jehovah’s Witnesses or pacifists who refuse to perform military service. Therefore, I 
consider it appropriate to use the term ‘conscientious objection’ to describe all three cases. 
2
 Maleiha Malik, 'Religious Freedom, Free Speech and Equality: Conflict or Cohesion?', 17 Res Publica (2011), 
pp. 21-40; Robert Wintemute, 'Accommodating Religious Beliefs: Harm, Clothing or Symbols, and Refusals to 
Serve Others', 77 Modern Law Review (2014), pp. 223-253; Erica Howard, 'Religious Rights versus Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination: A Fair Deal for Everyone', 10 Religion & Human Rights (2015), pp. 128-159; Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, 'Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex 
Marriage Laws', 5 Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy (2010), pp. 318-368; Bruce MacDougall, 
'Refusing to Officiate at Same-Sex Civil Marriages', 69 Saskatchewan Law Review (2006), pp. 352-373. 
3
 Alan Blinder and Tamar Lewin, 'Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail Over Deal on Same-Sex Marriage', New York 
Times, 3 September 2015, <www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davis-same-sex-marriage.html>, accessed 26 
December 2015. 
4
 Amanda Holpuch, 'Defiant Kentucky clerk summoned to federal court over gay marriage refusal', The 
Guardian, 1 September 2015, <www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/01/kentucky-clerk-kim-davis-same-
sex-marriage-supreme-court>, accessed 31 December 2015; Joan Faus, 'Encarcelada la funcionaria que deniega 
el matromonio homosexual', El Pais, 4 September 2015, 
<internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/09/03/actualidad/1441317531_656028.html>, accessed 31 
December 2015. 
5
 Obergefell v. Hodges, 26 June 2015, United States Supreme Court, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). 
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arrangements with her colleagues to avoid having to register same-sex partnerships.
6
 When 
word got out about her refusal, however, she was told by her employer that she would have to 
perform same-sex partnership duties, or risk losing her job. Ms. Ladele took her case to the 
UK courts, claiming to be the victim of (indirect) discrimination, but the courts ruled against 
her.
7
  
 The Netherlands, as well, has been the site of a heated debate on conscientious 
objection by civil servants to the registration of same-sex marriages, pitching same-sex 
equality against religious freedom. Initially, the Dutch authorities adopted a pragmatic 
approach in favour of freedom of religion, under which civil servants were granted 
exemptions.
8
 But they later departed from that approach, opting for a categorical/principled 
solution in favour of same-sex equality instead.
9
 In 2014, the Dutch legislator settled the issue 
by enacting legislation aimed at putting a definitive end to the practice of conscientious 
objection by civil servants to same-sex marriages.
10
  
 In this Article, I analyse the UK and Netherlands approach in terms of the limits of 
toleration in the liberal State. My primary aim is to offer a coherent explanation of the 
relevant practice. I locate that explanation in the political theoretical concept of toleration, and 
– more particularly – its limits. My core argument is that the UK courts' and Dutch legislator's 
                                                          
6
 The term ‘partnerships’ is used throughout to describe the UK case, since the events in the Ladele case took 
place before the enactment of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. The same arguments, obviously, 
apply to the current situation, in which marriage is available to same-sex couples in the UK. 
7
 Ladele v. London Borough of Islington, 15 December 2009, Court of Appeal for England and Wales, [2009] 
EWCA Civ 1357. Ms. Ladele also lost her case in Strasbourg, at the European Court of Human Rights. See 
Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 15 January 2013, European Court of Human Rights, Nos. 48420/10 
et al.. This Article will not analyse the ECtHR judgment, since its reasoning in relation to Ms. Ladele's case is 
both too short and too deferential to the UK to draw definitive conclusions from. For analyses of the Eweida 
judgment, see Howard, supra note 2; Ian Leigh and Andrew Hambler, 'Religious Symbols, Conscience, and the 
Rights of Others', 3 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2014), pp. 2-24. 
8
 See Opinion 2002-25, 15 March 2002, Equal Treatment Commission (the Netherlands); Opinion 2002-26, 15 
March 2002, Equal Treatment Commission (the Netherlands). 
9
 See Opinion 2008-40, 15 April 2008, Equal Treatment Commission (the Netherlands). 
10
 Wet van 4 juli 2014 tot wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en de Algemene wet gelijke behandeling met 
betrekking tot ambtenaren van de burgerlijke stand die onderscheid maken als bedoeld in de Algemene wet 
gelijke behandeling [Act of 4 July 2014 amending the Civil Code and the General Act on equal treatment, with 
regards to civil servants who treat persons differently in terms of the General Act on equal treatment], Staatsblad 
2014 260 (hereafter 2014 Act). 
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decisions are best understood as drawing the limits of toleration at the point where civil 
servants cause same-sex couples expressive harm. 
 In this Article, I provide an alternative account to existing scholarly analyses of the 
issue. My aim is, in particular, to improve upon those existing analyses. First, I aim to present 
an account that is more coherent with the actual practice than accounts that favour the civil 
servant, proponents of which generally submit that the civil servant should be granted an 
exemption or be reasonably accommodated.
11
 Although those accounts may appear powerful 
on paper, they have one fatal flaw. They fail, quite utterly, to explain the actual practice in 
States like the UK, Canada,
12
 the US and the Netherlands, in which courts and legislators 
have firmly and unequivocally rejected civil servants' freedom of religion claims.
13
 In this 
Article, I instead propose an account that is fully consonant with, and successfully explains, 
the relevant practice. 
 Second, the approach I propose in this Article aims to avoid the pitfalls into which 
some accounts that favour same-sex equality have fallen. Most particularly, I avoid hinging 
the argument on the contested belief-conduct distinction. At least one scholar who relies on 
the belief-conduct distinction to explain the relevant practice has admitted that it is 'not an 
ideal conceptual device',
14
 since it is potentially 'damaging and counter-productive'.
15
 Yet, the 
                                                          
11
 Fretwell Wilson, supra note 2; Geoffrey Trotter, ‘The Right to Decline Performance of Same-Sex Civil 
Marriages: The Duty to Accommodate Public Servants - A Response to Professor Bruce MacDougall’, 70 
Saskatchewan Law Review (2007), pp. 365-392; Andrew Hambler, 'Recognising a Right to "Conscientiously 
Object" for Registrars whose Religious Beliefs Are Incompatible with their Duty to Conduct Same-Sex Civil 
Partnerships', 7 Religion & Human Rights (2012), pp. 157-181. 
12
 Re Marriage Commissioners Appointed Under The Marriage Act, 10 January 2011, Court of Appeal for 
Saskatchewan, [2011] SKCA 3. 
13
 South Africa is an apparent exception among liberal States. See Civil Union Act 2007, s 6 ('A marriage officer 
... may in writing inform the Minister that he or she objects on the ground of conscience, religion and belief to 
solemnising a civil union between persons of the same sex, whereupon that marriage officer shall not be 
compelled to solemnise such civil union.'). It has been noted, however, that this conscience clause would most 
likely not survive constitutional scrutiny, were it to be challenged before the South African Constitutional Court. 
See Pierre de Vos, 'A Judicial Revolution? The Court-Led Achievement of Same-Sex Marriage in South Africa', 
4 Utrecht Law Review (2008), p. 172. 
14
 Malik, supra note 2, p. 38.  
15
 Ibid., p. 39. 
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same scholar did not – at the time16 – see an alternative way of convincingly arguing in favour 
of same-sex equality.
17
 In this Article, I suggest precisely such an alternative way.  
 Third, with this Article I aim to improve upon – in my estimation – the best legal 
scholarly account currently available, that of Robert Wintemute.
18
 Wintemute argues, within 
the framework of reasonable accommodation, that civil servants like Lillian Ladele should not 
be accommodated, because they cause same-sex couples material harm.
19
 Wintemute’s 
account succeeds in explaining the US case of Kim Davis, since she openly refused to register 
all marriages. She thereby caused same-sex and different-sex couples direct material harm. 
But Wintemute presented his argument in 2014, prior to the Davis case. He did, however, 
tackle the UK case of Lillian Ladele. Yet, in relation to her case, Wintemute's argument on 
material harm goes askew.
20
 It fails to convince, since Ms. Ladele never openly rejected 
same-sex couples. Instead, she made arrangements with her colleagues that left same-sex 
couples in the dark as to her conscientious objection. Moreover, all relevant same-sex couples 
obtained their partnership registration in Islington, without a hitch. As a result, none of them 
suffered material harm. In this Article, I maintain that they, instead, suffered expressive harm. 
I further step outside – or more accurately, beyond – the reasonable accommodation 
framework utilised by Wintemute by presenting an analysis in terms of the limits of toleration 
in the liberal State. I submit that this makes for a more coherent analysis of the issue, which 
not only concerns law, but also policy. The broader framework of toleration is, in particular, 
                                                          
16
 Malik has since adapted her argument somewhat. In her most recent publication on the issue, she complements 
her existing analysis with an element of harm and reliance on the public-private divide. This brings her argument 
closer the one presented in this Article, albeit in a less fully developed form (Malik does not, for instance, locate 
or identify the exact nature of the harm). See Maleiha Malik, 'Religion and Sexual Orientation: Conflict or 
Cohesion?', in G. D'Costa et al. (eds), Religion in a Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), pp. 67-92.   
17
 Malik, supra note 2. 
18
 Wintemute, supra note 2. For similar arguments, see Howard supra note 2. 
19
 Wintemute, supra note 2. 
20
 Ibid., p. 242. 
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better suited than existing accounts to explain legislative interventions, such as in the 
Netherlands. 
 
2 Case Studies: the UK and the Netherlands 
 
In this Article, I focus primarily on how the UK and the Netherlands have dealt with civil 
servants who conscientiously refuse to register same-sex marriages/partnerships. The US Kim 
Davis case, although interesting for the media attention it gathered, is largely left aside. There 
are two main reasons for this. First, Kim Davis's case is comparatively easy to resolve, given 
that she caused same-sex (and different-sex) couples material harm by openly refusing to 
deliver a public service. The UK and Dutch cases, conversely, pose more difficult questions, 
since no same-sex couple was ever denied a public service in those cases. I aim to provide a 
coherent account of these harder cases. Second, the Kim Davis case is in several ways 
peculiar, and therefore less representative of the broader issue. Most importantly, Kim Davis 
is an elected official who cannot be dismissed from her job, unlike most other civil servants. 
This explains why she was jailed
21
 for failing to comply with an injunction order,
22
 ordering 
her to register same-sex marriages (few other options were available to compel her to fulfil 
her duties under the law). Given the peculiarity of the Kim Davis case, I have elected to focus 
on the UK and Dutch cases, which are more representative of the broader issue.  
 In the UK and the Netherlands, a small number of civil servants refuse, for deeply held 
religious reasons, to register same-sex marriages/partnerships. In the UK, the issue is 
                                                          
21
 Miller v. Davis, 3 September 2015, United States District Court (Eastern District of Kentucky), No. 15-44-
DLB. 
22
 Miller v. Davis, 12 August 2015, United States District Court (Eastern District of Kentucky), No. 15-44-DLB. 
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epitomised in a leading court case: that of Lillian Ladele.
23
 Ms. Ladele is a devout Christian 
who worked as a registrar of births, marriages and deaths for the London Borough of 
Islington. During her career, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into force. From then 
onwards, Ms. Ladele was expected to register same-sex partnerships.
24
 She felt unable to do 
so, however, because of her 'orthodox Christian view that marriage is the union of one man 
and one woman for life' and her inability to 'reconcile her faith with taking an active part in 
enabling same sex unions to be formed'.
25
 Initially, Ms. Ladele informally arranged for some 
of her colleagues to take over whenever a same-sex partnership was assigned to her for 
registration. But when two LGBT colleagues complained to senior Islington staff about Ms. 
Ladele's conscientious objection, she was informed that she had to register same-sex 
partnerships herself. Ms. Ladele insisted that she could not comply, since she was being asked 
to 'facilitate the formation of a union which [she] sincerely believe[d] was contrary to God's 
law'.
26
 She invited Islington to accommodate her belief, but her request was refused. She then 
took her claim to the courts, where the final ruling – by the Court of Appeal27 – would be 
against her.
28
 The Court of Appeal held, in particular, that there was no scope for reasonable 
accommodation and that Ms. Ladele's dismissal would not constitute direct or indirect 
discrimination.  
                                                          
23
 Ladele, supra note 7. 
24
 In implementing the Civil Partnership Act 2004, municipalities were given the choice whether or not to 
designate all registrars as civil partnerships registrars. Several municipalities chose not to do so, but Islington did 
assign all its registrars, including Lillian Ladele, the duty of registering civil partnerships (reserved for same-sex 
couples). 
25
 Ladele, supra note 7, para. 7. 
26
 Ibid., para. 10. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 The UK House of Commons and House of Lords subsequently discussed amendments to the future Marriage 
(Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, aimed at introducing a conscience clause for civil servants in the Bill. Both 
attempts were, however, defeated by a large majority (340-150 in the House of Commons, 278-103 in the House 
of Lords). See HC Deb 20 May 2013, vol 563, cols 926-66; HL Deb 8 July 2013, vol 747, cols 39-62.  
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 In the Netherlands, the most recent figures show that 88 civil servants object to 
registering same-sex marriages.
29
 In Dutch legal and political discourse, such civil servants 
are referred to with a specific term: weigerambtenaren (objecting civil servants). Initially, 
weigerambtenaren were granted exemptions by the Dutch authorities.
30
 Later, however, the 
authorities changed their mind and started explicitly
31
 rejecting the exemption approach, 
substituting it with a categorical resolution in favour of same-sex equality.
32
 This evolution 
culminated in a 2014 Act, promulgated by the Dutch legislator to – eventually33 – put an end 
to the existence of weigerambtenaren.
34
 The 2014 Act provides that persons who would 
contravene Dutch anti-discrimination legislation cannot be assigned to the post of civil 
servant.
35
 Although the 2014 Act is phrased in neutral terms – and thus also applies to 
discrimination on other grounds than sexual orientation – its legislative history makes it 
abundantly clear that it is the result of a targeted legislative effort to curb the practice of 
conscientious objection by civil servants to the registration of same-sex marriages.
36
 
 
3 Analysis of the Practice in Terms of Toleration 
 
At first glance, the approach of the UK courts and Dutch legislator seems unwarranted. On 
paper at least, exemption and accommodation approaches are more appealing: if a solution 
                                                          
29
 Memorie van Toelichting bij de Wet van 4 juli 2014 tot wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en de Algemene 
wet gelijke behandeling met betrekking tot ambtenaren van de burgerlijke stand die onderscheid maken als 
bedoeld in de Algemene wet gelijke behandeling [Explanatory Report to Act of 4 July 2014...], Tweede Kamer 
der Staten-Generaal, 2012-2013, dossier 33.344, nr. 6 (hereafter Explanatory Report to 2014 Act). 
30
 Opinion 2002-25, supra note 8, para. 5.8; Opinion 2002-26, supra note 8, para. 5.7. 
31
 Opinion 2008-40, supra note 9, para. 3.30. 
32
 Ibid., paras. 3.27-3.28. 
33
 'Eventually', because the 2014 Act does not prohibit currently employed civil servants from requesting an 
exemption. See infra, note 84 and accompanying text.    
34
 2014 Act, supra note 10. 
35
 Ibid., Article I.2. 
36
 Explanatory Report to 2014 Act, supra note 29.  
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can be found that allows all parties to exercise their human rights – freedom of religion and 
same-sex equality – why not favour it? An analogous solution has, after all, been adopted in 
the case of abortion, on which legislation in the UK and the Netherlands contains a 
conscience clause for doctors and other health professionals.
37
  
 Yet, the intuitive appeal of civil-servant-friendly approaches is betrayed by the 
firmness with which the UK courts and the Dutch legislator have rejected them. I therefore 
proceed on the hypothesis that defenders of exemption and accommodation approaches to the 
same-sex marriage/partnership case are missing something. I locate that something in the 
concept of toleration and, more particularly, in its limits.
38
 I submit, in particular, that the 
decisions of the UK courts and the Dutch legislator are best understood as drawing the limits 
of toleration in the liberal State at the point where civil servants cause same-sex couples 
expressive harm. 
 
3.1 The Core Concept of Toleration and the Respect Conception of Vertical Toleration 
The principle of toleration has deep roots in the history of liberal thought. It dates back to at 
least the XVII
th
 Century and the works of – among others – John Locke and Pierre Bayle.39 
                                                          
37
 Abortion Act 1967, s 4 (1); Wet van 1 mei 1981 houdende regelen met betrekking tot het afbreken van 
zwangerschap [Act of 1 May 1981 concerning rules with regard to the termination of pregnancy], Article 20 (2). 
38
 For similar arguments, see Andrew Sabl, '"Virtuous to Himself": Pluralistic Democracy and the Toleration of 
Tolerations', in M. Williams and J. Waldron (eds.), Toleration and Its Limits (New York: New York University 
Press, 2008), pp. 220-242; Kent Greenawalt, 'Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience' 28 Journal of Law 
and Politics (2013), pp. 91-128; Yossi Nehushtan, 'What Are Conscientious Exemptions Really About?', 2 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2013), pp. 393-416. For contrary arguments, see François Boucher and 
Cécile Laborde, 'Why Tolerate Conscience?', Criminal Law and Philosophy (2014), DOI: 10.1007/s11572-014-
9357-7 (arguing that exemptions cannot be explained in terms of toleration); Emanuela Ceva, 'Why Toleration Is 
Not the Appropriate Response to Dissenting Minorities’ Claims', 23 European Journal of Philosophy (2015), pp. 
633-651 (arguing that at least certain claims for accommodation, namely those by 'democratic dissenting 
minorities' (which include religious conscientious objectors), cannot be understood in terms of toleration). 
39
 On John Locke and toleration, see Alex Tuckness, 'Locke's Main Argument for Toleration', in M.  Williams 
and J. Waldron (eds.), Toleration and Its Limits (New York: New York University Press, 2008), pp. 114-138. On 
Pierre Bayle, John Locke and toleration, see Rainer Forst, 'Pierre Bayle's Reflexive Theory of Toleration', in M. 
Williams and J. Waldron (eds.), Toleration and Its Limits (New York: New York University Press, 2008), pp. 
78-113. 
Pre-proof version 
10 
 
Against the backdrop of the European Wars of Religions, both Locke and Bayle argued for 
the toleration of adherents to (certain) other religions, as the basis for a right to freedom of 
conscience.
40
 Locke's and Bayle's argument for toleration was directed at their fellow citizens 
and at the State, as personified in the ruling monarch. As directed at the State, the argument 
was designed to restrict the monarch's power to use coercion against those who adhered to 
different religious denominations. 
 The language of toleration and tolerance has since survived the test of time.
41
 Not only 
has it remained a staple of liberalism,
42
 it is also ubiquitous in contemporary political and 
legal discourse. The European Court of Human Rights for instance insists that '[p]luralism, 
tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a "democratic society"'.
43
 The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe recently claimed that reasonable accommodation 'applied 
in a spirit of tolerance [...] allows all religious groups to live in harmony in the respect and 
acceptance of their diversity'.
44
 And the British Government proclaimed, in 2010, that 'Britain 
today is a far more diverse and tolerant society than it was a generation ago'.
45
 
 Yet, the rather loose use of the language of tolerance in practical discourse conceals 
the specificity and complexity of the concept in political theory. Although radically different 
conceptions of toleration have been put forward in the recent literature,
46
 the concept itself has 
                                                          
40
 Toleration was, however, not extended to all other believers or non-believers. Locke, in particular, rejected the 
toleration of Catholics and atheists. 
41
 I explain the difference between both below; see infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. 
42
 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: John W. Parker & Son, 1859); Joseph Raz, 'Autonomy, Toleration, 
and the Harm Principle', in S. Mendus (ed.), Justifying Toleration - Conceptual and Historical Perspectives 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 155-176; John Rawls, Political Liberalism (expanded 
edition) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 
43
 E.g., S.A.S. v. France, 1 July 2014, European Court of Human Rights, No. 43835/11, para. 128 (emphasis 
added). 
44
 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Tackling intolerance and discrimination in Europe with a 
special focus on Christians (Resolution 2036 (2015)), para. 2 (emphasis added). 
45
 HM Government, The Equality Strategy – Building a Fairer Britain, p. 6 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/85299/equality-strategy.pdf> accessed 
4 January 2016 (emphasis added). 
46
 See for instance Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) (introducing a conception of 'toleration as recognition'). For discussion, see Peter Jones, 'Toleration, 
Recognition and Identity', 14 The Journal of Political Philosophy (2006), pp. 123-143.  
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a clear and undisputed core.
47
 Based on the key works of Preston King and Rainer Forst, that 
core can be described as consisting of three components.
48
 Toleration firstly entails a negative 
element, often called the objection component: toleration only becomes relevant when one 
disapproves of the beliefs, actions or opinions of another. If one simply does not care about 
another's beliefs, actions or opinions, one cannot be tolerant of them, only indifferent towards 
them (which is not necessarily worse). Toleration secondly implies a positive element, 
generally referred to as the acceptance component: one is tolerant when one relies on positive 
considerations, for instance respect for freedom of conscience, that supersede the negative 
element of disapproval, without eliminating it. These positive elements lead one to not 
interfere with someone's beliefs, practices or opinions despite one's disapproval thereof. This 
is what makes toleration ambiguous: one disapproves of something, often strongly, but 
nevertheless decides not to interfere. Toleration finally has limits. At this point, the third and 
final element – the rejection component – comes in. The limits of toleration are reached when 
the positive considerations do not outweigh the negative element of disapproval. One thus 
rejects another's beliefs, practices or opinions, and – if one has the power to do so – intervenes 
in order to curb them.  
 From this core concept of toleration, two different conceptions can be distilled, 
depending on who the agent of toleration is, that is depending on who disapproves of 
another's beliefs, practices and/or opinions. When the agent of toleration is the State, we 
                                                          
47
 There exists some disagreement in the literature as to whether the existence of power relations between the 
agent and object of toleration should be part of the core concept of toleration and as to whether the objection 
component of toleration also includes dislike (in addition to disapproval). For discussion, see Catriona 
McKinnon, Toleration - A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 18-34; Rainer Forst, Toleration 
in Conflict - Past and Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 25-26; Emanuela Ceva and 
Federico Zuolo, 'A Matter of Respect: On Majority-Minority Relations in a Liberal Democracy', 30 Journal of 
Applied Philosophy (2013), p. 241. 
48
 Preston King, Toleration (London: Frank Cass, 1976), pp. 21, 44 and 51; Forst, supra note 47, pp. 18, 20 and 
23. Also of immediate relevance are Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (London: 
MacMillan, 1989), pp. 9-10; Galeotti, supra note 46, pp. 20-22.  
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speak of vertical toleration,
49
 that is toleration as a political practice by the State towards 
individuals.
50
 When the agent is the individual, we are dealing with a horizontal situation,
51
 in 
which tolerance is a moral virtue in interpersonal relationships.
52
 The difference between both 
conceptions is neatly captured by the linguistic distinction between vertical toleration and 
horizontal tolerance. In this Article, I present an analysis in terms of the former conception, 
that is of vertical toleration as a political practice. I am not concerned with horizontal 
tolerance as a moral virtue in interpersonal relationships. 
 Historically, both horizontal tolerance and vertical toleration have a long pedigree. 
Both conceptions were central to classical accounts of liberalism, such as those of John Locke 
and John Stuart Mill.
53
 Contemporary accounts of liberalism, however, tend to only 
incorporate tolerance as a moral virtue in interpersonal relationships.
54
 Toleration as a 
political practice, conversely, now has a negative connotation and is often considered to have 
become obsolete.
55
 David Heyd, for instance, argues that '[w]ith the establishment of modern 
liberal democracy ... the idea of toleration ... [has become] superfluous in its traditional 
political form [since] equality before the law and respect for the rights of individuals and 
minority groups tend to make toleration politically redundant'.
56
  
 The reason for the shift in liberal thinking from a need for tolerance and toleration to a 
requirement of tolerance only is located in crucial differences between the autocratic State of 
the early modern times of Locke, Bayle and Mill, during which vertical toleration was 
                                                          
49
 Forst, supra note 47, p. 6; Peter Jones 'Toleration, Religion and Accommodation', 23 European Journal of 
Philosophy (2015), p. 546. 
50
 Forst, supra note 47, p. 6. 
51
 Ibid.; Jones, supra note 49, p. 546. 
52
 Forst, supra note 47, p. 6. 
53
 See supra note 39 and accompanying text and  infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
54
 See for instance Rawls supra note 42. 
55
 For discussion, see Lorenzo Zucca, A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional 
Landscape (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Ch 1 – ‘Tolerance or Toleration?’.  
56
 David Heyd, 'Is Toleration a Political Virtue?', in M. Williams and J. Waldron (eds.), Toleration and Its Limits 
(New York: New York University Press, 2008), p 175. 
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considered both appropriate and necessary, and the liberal State as it exists today.
57
 As a result 
of these differences, a number of obstacles arise that prima facie block the path towards 
contemporary conceptions of vertical toleration. Elsewhere, I dismantle these obstacles and 
carve out space for vertical toleration in and by the contemporary liberal State.
58
 Here, I will 
explain why one obstacle in particular – the argument from human rights – requires us to 
rethink what toleration means, and under which circumstances it is an appropriate tool to deal 
with diversity.   
 The argument from human rights sets its sights on the objection component of 
toleration, which entails disapproval by someone with power (a majority; the State) of 
someone who lacks that power (a minority; a citizen). The argument from human rights is 
straightforward: persons do not wish to be disapproved of. They do not wish to see either 
themselves or their beliefs, practices and opinions tolerated – and nothing more – by the 
State.
59
 Instead, they demand something beyond toleration: acceptance, respect and/or 
recognition.
60
 The argument from human rights is, thus, an argument for a need to move 
beyond toleration. It can be applied both to horizontal tolerance and vertical toleration.
61
 What 
concerns us here is how the argument plays out in relation to vertical toleration. In that 
context, the argument can be summarised as follows: in the era of human rights, which give 
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 See Ceva and Zuolo, supra note 47; Lori Beaman, '"It Was All Slightly Unreal": What's Wrong with Tolerance 
and Accommodation in the Adjudication of Religious Freedom?', 23 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 
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expression to the fundamental equality of all persons, the State should be in the business of 
respecting and protecting those human rights, not in the business of toleration.
62
  
 Although the argument from human rights is a compelling one, it arguably overstates 
the case against vertical toleration. The argument does offer good reasons to reduce the scope 
for toleration in contemporary liberal States. It does not, however, make a solid case for the 
complete eradication of the concept. In other words, it presents a fair warning against vertical 
toleration, but does not offer reasons for its elimination from liberal vocabulary.
63
  
 In order to salvage vertical toleration as a tool to deal with diversity in the face of the 
argument from human rights, certain steps need to be taken. First, the historical conception of 
toleration should be replaced by a modern one.
64
 This historical conception of toleration is 
generally referred to as the permission conception. It dominated toleration discourse in the 
early modern times of Locke and Bayle and is based on the idea that the State should refrain 
from using its power to persecute individuals belonging to disapproved of minorities. Instead, 
it should tolerate their presence on its territory, that is permit them to stay there. As Forst 
explains, '[a]s long as [persons'] expression of their differences [remained] within limits, that 
is, [was] a “private” matter, and as long as they [did] not claim equal public and political 
status, they [could] be tolerated'.
65
 The permission conception of toleration thus cast the 
objects of toleration into an inferior status. It was, for that reason, labelled 'insulting' by 
Goethe and 'arrogant' by Kant.
66
 Clearly, there is no room for a permission conception of 
toleration in the contemporary liberal State, in which all persons are to be treated with equal 
respect. Other, more modern conceptions of toleration are available, however. 
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 On the respect conception of toleration, in particular, it is never appropriate for the 
State to disapprove of persons.
67
 The State should treat persons with equal respect, not 
tolerate them. It can, however, tolerate persons' practices and opinions.
68
 On the respect 
conception of toleration, persons are thus always the focus of equal respect, while their 
practices and opinions can be the focus of toleration.
69
 Discarding the permission conception 
for the respect conception of toleration is a crucial first step in addressing the argument from 
human rights and rendering vertical toleration congenial to the contemporary liberal State.
70
 
   
3.2 The Limited Space for Toleration in the Contemporary Liberal State 
But addressing the argument from human rights requires more. It also requires that the space 
for vertical toleration in and by the contemporary liberal State be duly limited. Given the 
peremptory force of human rights, the liberal State should not only respect persons, but in 
principle also their practices and/or opinions. Any space for vertical toleration in the 
contemporary liberal State should, therefore, be duly limited. I propose that such space 
nevertheless opens up in particular circumstances, namely when persons' practices or opinions 
prima facie infringe the core liberal values of equality, liberty (human rights) and/or 
autonomy.
71
 In those particular circumstances, the liberal State arguably has cause to 
disapprove of the practices or opinions at issue. Hence, the question of whether or not to 
tolerate them arises. 
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 Forst, supra note 47, p. 30; Thomas Scanlon, ‘The Difficulty of  Tolerance’, in D. Heyd (ed.), Toleration: An 
Elusive Virtue (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 226-239. 
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 A number of examples serve to further elucidate the argument.
72
 A first set of cases 
illustrates why the space for vertical toleration in the liberal State is limited. These are cases 
in which the liberal State has no cause for disapproval. Thus, toleration does not even enter 
the scene. A large number of trivial examples could be offered here, for within this category 
falls a wide array of practices and opinions that do not prima facie contravene basic liberal 
values. Eating an ice cream on a hot summer day and telling those around you to do the same, 
for instance, fall into this category of utterly trivial examples in which there is no room for 
toleration by the liberal State. But the same goes for prima facie more difficult cases. Take, 
for instance, the case of Muslim women wearing the niqab or burqa in public. This religious 
practice is prohibited under criminal law in France and Belgium, and is currently the object of 
proposed bans in other countries, including the Netherlands.
73
 Yet, by wearing a niqab or 
burqa, Muslim women do not contravene core liberal values. They do not violate others' or 
their own equality, human rights or autonomy. Some might object that they do contravene 
their own autonomy and/or equality. Such arguments, however, have been thoroughly 
dispelled in the facts by empirical research
74
 and firmly rejected in law by the European Court 
of Human Rights.
75
 Since Muslim women who wear a niqab or burqa do not contravene core 
liberal values, their practice should not be assessed in terms of toleration. There is simply no 
room for disapproval by the liberal State here. To be clear, this does not have conclusive 
consequences for the different question as to whether or not the practice can (or should) be 
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 For discussion of additional examples, see [reference omitted for review purposes]. 
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banned. Although I submit that the practice should be allowed,
76
 my primary aim has been to 
argue that it should not be analysed in terms of toleration.
77
     
 If there is no room for toleration in the preceding situations, then when does the 
limited space for vertical toleration by the liberal State open up? In the context of this Article, 
which focuses on conscientious objection, the prime example of toleration by the liberal State 
is arguably its response to conscience-based refusals to abortions. In most liberal States, 
including the UK and the Netherlands, conscience clauses in abortion legislation grant 
exemptions to doctors (and other health professionals) who conscientiously object to 
performing abortions.
78
 On my argument for vertical toleration, these are situations in which 
the liberal State has cause for disapproval. Indeed, the State may principally disapprove of a 
doctor's refusal to perform abortions, since it prima facie contravenes the basic liberal values 
of equality (gender equality), human rights (right to private life and potentially right to health 
of the woman who wishes to undergo an abortion),
79
 and autonomy (decisional privacy of the 
woman). But given that UK and Dutch abortion legislation contain conscience clauses, the 
practice is tolerated, not banned, by those States. States like the UK and the Netherlands may 
principally disapprove of refusals to grant women access to abortion services (rejection 
component of vertical toleration), but nevertheless do not force doctors and other health 
professionals to perform abortions when they cite conscientious objections (acceptance 
component of vertical toleration). They do so to safeguard freedom of religion. That makes it 
a prime example of vertical toleration.
80
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4 Conscientious Objection to Same-Sex Marriages: Beyond the Limits of 
Toleration 
 
So far, I have discussed cases that fall outside the scope for vertical toleration and cases that 
are the object of toleration. What remains to be done, is to explore the limits of toleration. The 
primary case study of this Article, on civil servants who conscientiously refuse to register 
same-sex marriages/partnerships, elucidates when the limits of vertical toleration have been 
exceeded. 
 
4.1 Drawing the Limits of Toleration 
Conscience-based refusals by civil servants to registering same-sex marriages/partnerships 
warrant disapproval by the liberal State, since they prima facie contravene the core liberal 
value of equality (discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). Unlike in the abortion 
case, the UK courts and Dutch legislator have, however, intervened to curb the practice. It is 
submitted here that the relevant decisions can successfully be explained in terms of the limits 
of toleration.  
 The Dutch legislative debate on the 2014 Act, in particular, was firmly rooted in the 
language of toleration. In delivering its negative advice on the 2014 Act, which bars persons 
who would contravene anti-discrimination legislation from obtaining the post of civil servant, 
the Dutch Council of State insisted that '[a] pragmatic approach, which fits in the Dutch 
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tradition of toleration vis-à-vis divergent opinions, would be the obvious route to take.'
81
 The 
proponents of the 2014 Act, however, vehemently disagreed. They conceded that 'giving 
space to conscientious objections in general fits in the Dutch tradition of toleration vis-à-vis 
different religious conceptions', but immediately added that 'unfortunately there are, in Dutch 
society, also developments that contravene this tradition [...] The problem is that religions are 
not always as tolerant.'
82
 The proponents of the 2014 Act concluded that '[w]hat can help in a 
climate of intolerance, is not the search for "pragmatic solutions" for the consequences of that 
intolerance, but the consistent upholding of the prohibition of discrimination.'
83
 The 2014 Act 
was thus intended to put an end to intolerance in society. In other words, it refused to extend 
toleration to those who would act intolerantly.  
 An interesting feature of the Dutch 2014 Act, however, is that it draws the limits of 
toleration in relation to future civil servants, while simultaneously engaging in toleration 
towards currently employed civil servants. Indeed, the 2014 Act – by design84 – does not 
apply to currently employed civil servants, even when they object to registering same-sex 
marriages. The reason is a pragmatic one: the legislator did not wish to intrude on the 
competence of municipalities to determine what to do with currently employed civil servants. 
The legislator did, however, clearly disapprove of the practice at issue (disapproval thereof 
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was, after all, the very reason for the adoption of the 2014 Act).
85
 Hence, currently employed 
civil servants who refuse to register same-sex marriages are (temporarily) tolerated in the 
Netherlands, at least insofar as the Dutch legislator is concerned.
86
 
 Contrary to the Dutch legislative debate on the 2014 Act, the UK courts' rulings are 
not replete with the language of toleration. This can be explained by the more restrictive role 
of the judiciary, which is – in principle – to apply the law, not 'decide on the rights and 
wrongs of toleration'.
87
 Although the language of tolerance and toleration does occasionally 
crop up in judicial rulings,
88
 it is arguably more congenial to political debate.
89
 Unlike 
political bodies, courts are limited to the use of legal language. It should thus not come as a 
surprise that, in judicial rulings, the language of toleration is generally replaced by language 
with which the law is more familiar. In the UK case of Lillian Ladele, this was the language 
of reasonable accommodation and of (indirect) discrimination. Yet, this does not detract from 
the fact that the UK courts have given practical effect to the same underlying idea as the one 
explicitly relied on by the Dutch legislator: in a liberal State, the practice of civil servants who 
refuse to register same-sex marriages/partnerships exceeds the limits of toleration, and can 
therefore not be allowed.
90
 
 
4.2 Why Draw the Limits There? Toleration and Expressive Harm 
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I have submitted that the UK courts' ruling and the Dutch 2014 Act can be understood in 
terms of the limits of toleration. Yet, the question remains: why were those limits exceeded? 
After all, in neither the UK, nor the Netherlands, were same-sex couples denied a public 
service. They thus did not suffer any material harm.
91
 Here, I argue that the limits of toleration 
were nevertheless exceeded because same-sex couples suffered expressive harm.
92
  
 Ever since John Stuart Mill wrote On Liberty, the liberal tradition has recognised the 
existence of a strong link between toleration and harm, in the sense that the limits of toleration 
should be drawn by some version of the harm principle.
93
 How broad or narrow one conceives 
of these limits is determined by how one interprets harm. I submit that the Dutch legislator's 
and the UK courts' decisions are best understood in terms of expressive harm.  
 The notion of expressive harm is directly related to the expressive function of law: the 
law should express appropriate attitudes toward persons.
94
 The "appropriate" attitude is 
generally interpreted as one of equal concern and respect.
95
 Law can be expressive in a 
positive sense, for instance when a State adopts criminal hate speech legislation to send the 
expressive message, over and beyond the repressive function of the criminal law, that all 
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 Raz, supra note 41, p. 174; Glyn Morgan, 'The Mode and Limits of John Stuart Mill's Toleration', in M. 
Williams and J. Waldron (eds.), Toleration and Its Limits (New York: New York University Press 2008), p. 154. 
94
 On the expressive function of law, see Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes, 'Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement', 148 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2000), pp. 1503-1575; Cass Sunstein, 
'Incommensurability and Valuation in Law', 92 Michigan Law Review (1994), pp. 779-861; Cass Sunstein, 'On 
the Expressive Function of Law', 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1996), pp. 2021-2053. For 
critiques, see Matthew Adler, 'Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview', 148 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review (2000), pp. 1363-1501; Simon Blackburn, 'Group Minds and Expressive Harm', 60 
Maryland Law Review (2001), pp. 467-491. 
95
 Anderson and Pildes, supra note 94, p. 1520 (with reference to Dworkin on the link with 'equal concern and 
respect').   
Pre-proof version 
22 
 
individuals in society are worthy of equal respect.
96
 State action can, however, also take a 
negative expressive turn, namely when it causes expressive harm.  
 Expressive harm is, then, the harm suffered by a person 'when she is treated [by the 
State] according to principles that express negative or inappropriate attitudes toward her'.
97
 
Expressive harm is thus closely linked with the notion of "second-class citizenship".
98
 
Arguably the historically most prominent example is that of racial segregation, as it was once 
practiced in the United States.
99
 Racial segregation causes expressive harm because it 'sends 
the message that blacks are untouchable, a kind of social pollutant from which "pure" whites 
must be protected'.
100
 It is important to note, as illustrated by the racial segregation example, 
that expressive harm is not only caused by verbally communicated messages, but also by non-
verbal State action.
101
  
 I submit that the decisions of the UK courts and the Dutch legislator are best 
understood as recognising that civil servants were causing expressive harm to same-sex 
couples by refusing to register same-sex marriages/partnerships. Not only were they acting as 
State agents, their duties of registration were also directly identified as State duties.
102
 By 
refusing to register same-sex marriages and partnerships, the civil servants failed to treat 
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same-sex couples with equal respect.
103
 It is, indeed, difficult to conceive of the refusals as 
anything other than instances in which State agents treated LGBT as second-class citizens.
104
  
 An objection could be raised against the above characterisation, however, by insisting 
that no harm – expressive or otherwise – was caused to same-sex couples, because individual 
couples were not even aware of the civil servants' refusal.
105
 Two responses to this argument 
are available. The first, practical, response is that the facts of Lillian Ladele’s case reveal that 
it is difficult to keep these kinds of refusals hidden.
106
 They are likely, sooner or later, to 
become public knowledge. The second, principled, response is that expressive harm can be 
caused without the subject of the message being aware of it. Expressive harm does not require 
knowledge.
107
 It is caused by the action itself, here the refusal by the civil servant, and does 
not depend on it being received by an audience.
108
 
 The above arguments on the expressive function of law and expressive harm find 
support in the rulings of the UK courts and the decision of the Dutch legislator. In the case of 
Lillian Ladele, the UK courts dismissed the reasonable accommodation route, because 
insistence thereon 'mischaracterised Islington’s aim by treating it as a purely practical one of 
delivering an efficient system'.
109
 Instead, the courts identified Islington's proper aim as that 
of providing a service 'which complied with their overarching policy of being "an employer 
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and a public authority wholly committed to the promotion of equal opportunities and to 
requiring all its employees to act in a way which does not discriminate against others"'.
110
 The 
courts ruled that 'Ms Ladele’s proper and genuine desire to have her religious views relating 
to marriage respected should not be permitted to override Islington’s concern to ensure that all 
its registrars manifest equal respect for the homosexual community'.
111
 These passages are 
best understood in terms of expressive harm and the expressive function of Islington's non-
discrimination policy.
112
  
 Similar considerations apply to the Dutch case, where the 2014 Act was adopted for 
both principled and symbolic reasons.
113
 A crucial reason for the adoption of the 2014 Act 
was the legislator's insistence that '[w]hat can help in a climate of intolerance, is not the 
search for "pragmatic solutions" for the consequences of that intolerance, but the consistent 
upholding of the prohibition of discrimination'.
114
 The Dutch government underscored the 
expressive aim of the 2014 Act by referring to its passing as 'an important step that partly has 
a symbolic character',
115
 and by stating that  
 
with this [Act] a message is being sent, not only towards this category of 
registrars, but in the first place to all gays and lesbians in the Netherlands and 
eventually towards Dutch society as a whole: the norm is that we in no way wish 
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to differentiate between persons of equal sex who get married and persons of 
different sex who get married.
116
  
 
 To sum up, in both the UK and the Netherlands, the limits of toleration were drawn to 
prevent State agents from causing further expressive harm to same-sex couples. The Dutch 
2014 Act and Islington's non-discrimination policy further pursued the expressive aim of 
ensuring that all citizens – including LGBT – would be treated with equal concern and 
respect.
117
 
 
5 Conclusion: Explaining Differences + Brief Foray into other Cases 
 
In this Article, I have argued that there exists limited space for vertical toleration in the 
contemporary liberal State. Such limited space opens up in particular circumstances, namely 
when persons' practices and/or expressed opinions contravene basic liberal values (equality, 
human rights and autonomy). Liberal States like the UK and the Netherlands nevertheless 
tolerate some such practices, including conscientious objections by health professionals to the 
performance of abortions. Yet, those same States refuse to extend toleration to civil servants 
who conscientiously refuse to register same-sex marriages/partnerships. I have argued that 
both the UK courts' rulings in the Lillian Ladele case and the Dutch 2014 Act draw the limits 
of toleration at the point where State agents cause same-sex couples expressive harm.  
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 What remains to be done here, in the conclusion, is to provide an explanation as to 
why the same States that extend toleration to health professionals who refuse to perform 
abortions, deny it to civil servants who refuse to register same-sex marriages/partnerships. 
Parallels should also be drawn to other cases, namely those of private persons (such as bed 
and breakfast owners) who refuse to deliver services to same-sex couples, and conscientious 
objections to military service.   
 First, some explanations will be offered for the difference in treatment of health 
professionals in the abortion case and civil servants in the same-sex marriage/partnership 
case. The question is: what makes the abortion case so different from the same-sex 
marriage/partnership case that the former would invite toleration, while the latter exceeds the 
limits of toleration? One possible explanation is that health professionals and civil servants 
hold different statuses, the latter being public officials, while the former are private persons. 
But this does not provide a satisfactory answer, since conscience clauses in abortion 
legislation also apply to health professionals in public hospitals, that is to public officials. The 
explanation for the difference must thus be located elsewhere.  
 A few hypotheses can be ventured. First, a hypothesis on the nature of the actions 
performed. In the same-sex marriage/partnership case, being forced to act against one's 
conscience entails having to register a same-sex marriage or partnership by signing a piece of 
paper. In the abortion case, conversely, it requires active and personal involvement in the 
termination of what one considers to be life.
118
 There are, thus, important differences between 
the abortion and the same-sex marriage/partnership case: the doctor's action in the abortion 
case is both graver and more directly related to her conscience than that of the civil servant in 
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 The UK Supreme Court has interpreted the conscience clause in the Abortion Act 1967 in that sense. 
According to the Supreme Court, the decisive criterion for granting an exemption in the abortion case is the 
'actually taking part', in a 'hands-on capacity', in the performance of abortions. Greater Glasgow Health Board v. 
Doogan & Anor, 17 December 2014, United Kingdom Supreme Court, [2014] UKSC 68, paras. 37-38. 
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the same-sex marriage/partnership case.
119
 These differences arguably go a long way towards 
explaining why toleration is extended in the abortion case, but not in the same-sex 
marriage/partnerships case. A second hypothesis complements the first: the doctor's refusal is 
more easily accessible in the language of public reason. The doctor's refusal can, more 
particularly, be expressed in secular language on the value of (or right to) life, which is 
accessible to all persons, including those who hold different beliefs.
120
 The civil servant's 
objection, conversely, can only sensibly be expressed in religious terms. To non-believers, 
including the State, it will – as the practice shows – tend to come across as homophobia, since 
it cannot easily be detached from conservative religious views that categorise same-sex 
conduct as a "sin". Both hypotheses, when combined, arguably explain the difference between 
the same-sex marriage/partnership and the abortion case. They explain why the latter is 
tolerated in liberal States like the UK and the Netherlands, while the former is not. 
 Closely related to the same-sex marriage/partnership cases studied in this Article, are 
cases in which private persons refuse to facilitate same-sex marriages/partnerships.
121
 A 
prominent legal case is that of Bull v. Hall, involving Christian bed and breakfast owners in 
the UK who refused to let a double room to a same-sex couple.
122
 The UK Supreme Court 
ruled against the bed and breakfast owners, finding that they had unjustly discriminated 
against the same-sex couple. The practice of the bed and breakfast owners was thus, just like 
that of civil servants, not tolerated. There are, however, crucial differences between both 
cases. Most importantly, the bed and breakfast owners are private citizens, not State agents. 
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 In that sense, as Nejaime and Siegel have usefully pointed out, the relevant comparator to the doctor in the 
abortion case is not the civil servant refusing to register a same-sex marriage, but a member of the clergy 
refusing to solemnize a same-sex marriage. Interestingly, this more comparable situation is, like the abortion 
case, generally covered by an exemption: members of the clergy cannot be forced to solemnize same-sex 
marriages. This offers further support for the hypothesis ventured in the text. See Douglas Nejaime and Reva 
Siegel, 'Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics', 124 Yale Law Journal 
(2015), pp. 2561-2562. 
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 See also Horton, supra note 59, p. 39; Wintemute, supra note 2, p. 247. 
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 See e.g., Elaine Photopgrahpy, LLC v. Willock, 22 August 2013, Supreme Court of New Mexico, No. 2013-
NMSC-040; Bull & Anor v. Hall & Anor, 27 November 2013, United Kingdom Supreme Court, [2013] UKSC 
73; Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 13 August 2015 , Court of Appeals of Colorado, No. 14CA1351. 
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 Bull v. Hall, supra note 121.  
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Since expressive harm is intimately tied to State action, the explanation offered in this Article 
as to why the limits of toleration were exceeded in the case of the civil servants cannot be 
extended to the bed and breakfast owners. The question therefore arises: where is the harm in 
the bed and breakfast case? The obvious answer is that the case entails material harm: denial 
of services.
123
 This explains why the practice in the bed and breakfast case is not tolerated, 
just like the practice of the civil servants.
124
 
 The final case to be considered is that of conscientious objection to military service. 
Here, interestingly, exemptions are usually granted to both religious and non-religious 
objectors, provided that they base themselves on sincerely held beliefs or convictions. Where 
do these cases fit in the argument presented in this Article? I submit that they fall outside the 
scope for vertical toleration in the liberal State, since they do not entail practices that 
contravene basic liberal values. A person who objects to the performance of military service 
(whether for religious or non-religious reasons) may be seen as jeopardising national security 
or other public interests, but she does not contravene her own or others' equality, human rights 
or autonomy. Thus, the liberal State has no cause to disapprove of her practices, as such.
125
 In 
other words, conscientious objection to military service should, just like the case of the 
                                                          
123
 See also Wintemute, supra note 2, p. 251 (arguing that, since the service will generally be 'refused to the face 
of the customer', it causes direct harm). See further Ilias Trispiotis, '"Alternative Lifestyles" and Unlawful 
Discrimination: The Limits of Religious Freedom in Bull v Hall', European Human Rights Law Review (2014), 
p. 46 (arguing, in relation to Bull & Anor v. Hall & Anor, that the Supreme Court 'locates the harm ... in the 
relationship between "stigma, denial of opportunities and the historical facts of disadvantage"' (footnote with 
literature reference omitted)). 
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 For a similar analysis, see Chai Feldblum, 'Moral Conflict and Human rights: Gay Rights and Religion', 72 
Brooklyn Law Review (2006), pp. 119-120 (arguing that the government should not tolerate bed and breakfast 
owners who exclude same-sex couples). 
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 It may consider the importance of national security, but this is not a basic liberal value. It being potentially in 
jeopardy is thus not, on the argument presented in this Article, a cause for disapproval by the liberal State 
(although it might still be cause to refuse to grant an exemption). 
Pre-proof version 
29 
 
Muslim woman who wears a burqa or niqab in public, not be analysed in terms of 
toleration.
126
  
 As it turns out, the arguments on vertical toleration I have presented in this Article can 
successfully be applied to a wide variety of conscientious objection cases. They moreover 
offer a coherent explanation for the relevant practice in liberal States like the UK and the 
Netherlands. Vertical toleration is thus not a relic of the past. Although it should only be 
extended in limited circumstances, like the abortion case, it remains an important tool for the 
liberal State to tackle diversity. Duly limited by the harm principle, theories on vertical 
toleration further explain why exemptions are denied to civil servants who refuse to register 
same-sex marriages/partnerships. Their practices are not tolerated by the liberal State.   
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 Compare Wintemute, supra note 2, p. 229 (listing conscientious objection to military services among those 
cases in which no harm is caused and in which accommodation involves minimal costs; and should therefore be 
granted). 
